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Abstract
A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litiga-
tion environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by
the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each
party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational
litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This
framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise
under a continuum of legal systems. The British, American and some recently
proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.
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1 Introduction
Why is the United States internationally scorned as the “litigious society?” Are judi-
cial reforms, such as those proposed by the President’s Council on Competitiveness,
justified or misguided? More generally, can one rank the legal expenditures induced
by legal systems such as the American, British, and Continental Rules, and if so, do
systems that result in lower expenditures per trial necessarily reduce the social cost
of litigation? This paper uses an auction-theoretic framework to address these and
other questions.
Our paper is motivated in part by the growing policy debate over the need for
reform of the American justice system.1 For instance, as early as 1991 the President’s
Council on Competitiveness (chaired at that time by Vice President Dan Qualye),
proposed to modify the American legal system (in which all litigants pay their own
legal expenditures) by requiring that the loser reimburse the winner for legal fees up
to the amount actually spent by the loser.2 The rationale for the proposed “Quayle
system” was that it would reduce legal expenditures and the number of cases brought
to court, since every dollar the loser paid its attorneys would ultimately result in two
dollars paid by the loser. Other legal systems (such as the British and Continental
1A number of recent papers provide important insights regarding the impact of reforms designed
to deter frivolous suits (Che and Earnhart, 1997; Bebchuk and Chang, 1996; Polinski and Rubinfeld,
1996, 1998) or affect settlement incentives (Spier,1994; Gong and McAfee, 2000).
2This was proposed in the Council’s Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (1991).
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rules), also require losers to compensate winners for a portion of their legal costs.3
In modeling litigation, simplifying assumptions are typically made to facilitate
the analysis. One approach, common to the literature on pre-trial negotiation and
settlement, assumes that legal expenditures during a trial do not have any effect on
the trial’s outcome. For instance, Spier (1992) assumes that it is costly for a plaintiff
to go to court but that these costs do not influence the court’s decision. In her model,
the plaintiff always wins, but the amount won is a random variable from a distribution
f (v) with a strictly increasing hazard rate, f/ (1− F ). Schweizer (1989) considers
a model where both the plaintiff and defendant might win, but the probability of
winning is exogenous and independent of the legal expenditures of the parties. While
these modeling assumptions are useful for understanding why parties in a dispute
have an incentive to settle out of court rather than going to trial, they do not permit
a comparative analysis of the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise in situations
where parties can improve their chances of winning a trial by hiring better attorneys
or experts.
Another approach, called the optimism model (cf. Hughes and Snyder, 1995),
assumes that each party has exogenous beliefs regarding the merits of their case.
These beliefs determine not only whether the parties settle, but the expected payoff
3Under the British system, the loser pays its own legal costs and, in addition, reimburses the
winner for all of its costs. The Continental system requires the loser to pay its own legal costs, plus
a fixed fraction of the winner’s legal fees.
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to each party from a trial. In particular, under the American rule the plaintiff’s
expected payoff from trial is pA−x, where p is her belief concerning the likelihood of
winning an amount A in trial, and x is the amount the plaintiff must spend to litigate
the case. In contrast, under the British rule the plaintiff’s expected payoff is given by
pA− (1− p) (x+ y), where y is the amount the defendant must spend to defend the
litigation. Based on this model, Hughes and Snyder conclude that when p is greater
than 0.5 and litigation expenditures are symmetric (x = y), the British Rule leads to
a lower expected payoff for the plaintiff than the American rule. As a consequence,
plaintiffs will litigate fewer cases: For exogeneously given legal expenditures per trial,
and exogeneous subjective probabilities of winning a case, the British rule leads to
lower total legal outlays than the American system.
Our analysis differs from this existing literature in several respects. First, we focus
on a symmetric trial environment rather than pre-trial negotiation and settlements.
In situations where the court and/or parties can readily observe the underlying merits
of the case, one would expect the parties to reach a settlement or otherwise the court
to issue summary judgement. In our model, cases brought to trial have the property
of being symmetric in the sense that the observable merits of each side’s position are
roughly the same, at least initially.
Secondly, we assume that the parties in such a suit can influence the observ-
able merits of their case (and thus their probability of winning) by purchasing legal
services. Thus, unlike the existing literature which assumes either that there is an
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a priori “correct” verdict or that the probability of winning is independent of the
quality of legal services purchased by the litigants, we examine the equilibrium ex-
penditures that arise under various legal systems. Equilibrium requires, among other
things, that expenditures on legal services be based on rational beliefs regarding the
probability of winning: Subjective beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
As we will see, these modeling differences enable us to use auction-theoretic tools
to examine how rational litigants respond to the incentives created by various fee-
shifting rules.4 In addition, we are able to examine the impact of asymmetric infor-
mation (among the parties and the court) on equilibrium litigation expenditures and
outcomes under a continuum of legal settings, including the Quayle system. This is
in contrast to existing work that provides pairwise comparisons of the American and
British rules (cf. Shavell (1982), Braeutigam, Owen, and Panzar (1984)), or models
such as those by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Hause (1989) which are based on
different informational and/or rationality assumptions.
Our simple model also sheds light on two competing views of the justice system.
One view — held by many Americans — is that winners and losers in court cases are
determined by how much the parties spend on high-priced attorneys — not on the
intrinsic merits of the case. At the other extreme is the view that justice is always
served — how much you pay an attorney is irrelevant; all that matters is the quality of
4As noted by Klemperer (2000), auction theory is a powerful tool for analyzing a host of economic
problems, including litigation.
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the case presented at trial. We show that these two views need not be inconsistent.
More specifically, we examine symmetric trial environments where (1) legal ex-
penditures increase the quality of the case presented; (2) justice is always served, and
(3) litigation costs are neither subsidized nor taxed in the aggregate. Here, symmetric
means that the initial endowments of evidence make the case equally meritorious in
the eyes of the law, and furthermore, each party has access to equally qualified attor-
neys to present their side of the case to the court. To be concrete, consider a divorced
couple engaged in a nasty custody battle over a child. When the initial endowments
are symmetric (for instance, both parent’s work and are on good terms with the
child), there is no a priori basis for determining the “correct” or “incorrect” decision.
All the court can do is evaluate the arguments presented by each side, and award
custody to the party presenting the best case. Thus, the assumption that “justice is
always served” does not mean that absolute “truth” was realized, but rather that the
court awarded custody to the most deserving party, given the evidence presented at
trial.
Section 2 presents a parameterized litigation model that subsumes the American,
British, and Continental systems as special cases. Novel systems like the Quayle sys-
tem, the Matthew system (where the winner pays the loser an amount that is propor-
tional the winner’s legal expenditures), and the Marshall System (where the winner
graciously picks up the loser’s legal bill), all obtain as special cases. Our Proposition
1 shows that, in any litigation environment where justice is always served, players
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have symmetric access to “quality” legal representation, and where legal expenditures
increase the quality of the case presented to the court, then the player spending the
most on attorneys always wins. Thus, “just outcomes” are not inconsistent with the
observation that the winning party spent the most on attorney’s.
Section 3 uses auction-theoretic tools to characterize the equilibrium legal ex-
penditures that arise for the parameterized class of legal systems, while Section 4
offers several Propositions which may be used to compare the expenditures that arise
under alternative fee-shifting rules. We also identify a legal system that results in
minimal legal expenditures per trial while guaranteeing that the judicial outcome is
both “just” and efficient. We find that, in equilibrium, the American system results
in lower expected legal costs per trial than either the Continental or British system,
and furthermore, that the Quayle system leads to precisely the same expected legal
expenditures as the American system. However, Proposition 5 shows that the incen-
tive to go to trial is actually higher under the American system than the Continental
or British System. A testable implication is that there are more trials in the U.S. than
in Britain or on the Continent, but that less is spent on a per-trial basis in the United
States. Litigation incentives under the Quayle and American systems are identical,
so we may conclude that the Council’s proposal does not represent an improvement
over the status quo. More generally we find that there is a trade-off between the
expected legal expenditures per trial and the number of trials: Legal systems that
result in lower expenditures per trial result in a greater number of trials.
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2 A Model of Litigation
Two parties are unable to settle a dispute regarding the ownership of an indivisible
asset. Each party i values the asset at vi, and these valuations are independent
random draws from a continuous density f with distribution function F .5 Each
party’s valuation is private information, unobserved by the other party and the court.
The distribution of valuations is assumed to be common knowledge.
The legal ownership of the asset in dispute is unknown. The role of the court is to
examine the evidence presented at trial and, based on the evidence, award the asset
to one of the parties. It is costly for the parties to gather evidence and present their
case. We assume that the quality of the case presented by a party (qi) is a function
of her expenditures on legal services. The court observes only the quality of the case
presented by each party (q1 and q2).
The litigation environment requires the two parties to simultaneously commit
to legal expenditures, ei ≥ 0. Of course, different litigation systems have different
implications for ultimate payoffs of the parties. For instance, the American system
requires the winner and loser to pay their own legal expenditures, while the British
system requires the loser to reimburse the winner for her legal expenditures. To
capture the effects of different legal environments, assume that the payoff to party i
depends on whether she wins or loses the trial as well as the fee-shifting rules implied
5The analysis can readily be extended to the case of correlated values and/or the case where
litigants receive affiliated signals of values, see Baye et al. (1998).
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by the justice system:
ui(ei, ej , vi) =



vi − βei − δej if party i wins
−αei − θej if party i loses
(1)
Here, (β,α, δ, θ) are fee-shifting parameters that summarize the amount of legal ex-
penditures borne by each party in the event of a favorable or unfavorable judgement.
We assume that (β,α) ≥ 0, with strict inequality for at least one element. This
implies that, given the judicial decision, a party’s utility is non-increasing in her legal
expenditures. In contrast, the parameters (δ, θ) may be positive or negative, depend-
ing upon whether the winner and loser pay or receive a transfer based on the other
party’s legal expenditures. This formulation permits us to examine a variety of legal
environments. For instance, when β = α = 1 and δ = θ = 0, the model captures
the American system where each party pays her own legal expenses regardless of the
outcome. The case where α = θ = 1 and β = δ = 0 corresponds to the British
system, where the loser pays its own legal costs as well as those of the winner.
To complete the model, we assume that the court’s decision is influenced by the
quality of the case presented by each party. The quality of party i’s case, in turn,
is a continuous, strictly increasing function of her legal expenditures. We focus on
environments where parties are endowed with symmetric technologies for producing
a favorable case. In other words, neither party has a distinct advantage with respect
to the evidentiary or legal merits of her claims to the disputed asset, nor access to
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an attorney capable of making superior legal argument on her behalf. Obviously, in
some legal environments one party has a stronger claim to the asset than the other
party. Cases such as these are typically settled out of court or otherwise dismissed on
summary judgement by the court.6 Regardless, our focus on situations where both
parties are on equal footing permits us to compare expenditures in a meaningful way
across different fee allocation mechanisms.
More formally, let qi denote the quality of party i’s case and φ denote the pro-
duction function that maps each player’s legal expenditures into that player’s case
quality. We assume
(A1) Monotonic Legal Production Function The quality of the case presented
by player i is given by qi = φ (ei) , where φ is a continuous and strictly increasing
function of player i’s expenditures on legal services.
Notice that we are taking an agnostic position with respect to any notion of the
“truth” underlying the case. Our motivation for this is two-fold. First, in many
disputes regarding ownership, each side believes that they have a legal right to the
item in dispute. Each side presents arguments supporting a decision in their favor, and
the court’s role is to weigh the case presented by the parties and render its decision.
Second, since our objective is to compare the amount spent for legal services under
6Waldfogel (1998) presents evidence which suggests that the pretrial adjudication process tends
to weed out parties with observable asymmetries, so that parties actually going to trial (and trial
outcomes) tend to be symmetric.
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various fee-shifting rules, it is important to restrict attention to environments where
legal expenditures do not distort the truth. While situations do arise where a party
expends hefty legal expenditures to “wrongfully” win a case, a comparative analysis
of fee-shifting rules in such environments would be misguided. In particular, if one
fee-shifting system resulted in lower expenditures than another system but resulted
in more “incorrect” judicial decisions, the relative merits of the two systems would
depend on the social trade-off (if any) between “justice” and legal costs.
Since we are assuming that the truthful ownership of the item in dispute is un-
known, “justice” reduces to the situation where the court weighs the evidence pre-
sented and awards the asset to the party with the most meritorious case.
(A2) Justice is Always Served If party i presents the best case (qi > qj) , party
i wins with probability one. If the two parties’ cases are of identical quality
(qi = qj), each party wins with probability 1/2.
This assumption rules out judicial mistakes and jury nullification whereby the court
rules in favor of the party presenting the weakest case.
Finally, we focus on environments where the two litigants’ legal expenditures
are neither subsided nor taxed by an outside party. Thus, while the loser and/or
winner might be required to reimburse the other party for some portion of her legal
expenditures, the sum of the expenditures of the two litigants exactly equals the
aggregate amount spent on legal services. We formalize this assumption as
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(A3) Internalized Legal Costs There are no subsidies or taxes; all legal expenses
are borne by the litigants.
We are now in a position to characterize the players’ payoff functions.
Proposition 1 Suppose assumptions A1 through A3 hold. Then the payoff functions
for the two parties are given by7
ui(ei, ej , vi) =



vi − βei − (1− α) ej if ei > ej ≥ 0
vi/2− e if ei = ej = e ≥ 0
−αei − (1− β) ej if ej > ei ≥ 0
(2)
Proof: Note that assumption A3 implies that α+ δ = β + θ = 1, so δ = (1− α)
and θ = (1− β). By A2, party i wins if qi > qj, loses if qj > qi, and wins with
probability 1/2 if qi = qj. Substituting these relations into equation (1) yields
ui(ei, ej, vi) =



vi − βei − (1− α) ej if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−αei − (1− β) ej if qj > qi
But by A1, qi = φ (ei) and φ is monotonic. This implies that qi ≥ qj if and only if
ei ≥ ej , which yields the form of payoffs in equation (2). QED
Several aspects of Proposition 1 are worth noting. First, in symmetric environ-
ments where legal expenditures enhance the quality of the case presented to the court
and justice is always served, the party spending the most on legal services always wins.
7We assume that in the event of a tie, the court flips a coin to determine the winner.
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Outcomes where parties appear to “buy justice” by hiring superior (and more costly)
attorneys are, in fact, consistent with justice being served; indeed, these legal envi-
ronments imply such outcomes. The contrapositive of Proposition 1 implies that, if
the party spending the most does not win, then there were either judicial mistakes or
the parties were endowed with different technologies for making their case. The latter
might occur due to differences in access to “quality” legal counsel or different initial
endowments of “evidence.” While our focus on symmetric legal environments where
justice is always served is not without loss of generality, it is the natural benchmark
to use in comparing the relative merits of different fee-shifting rules.
Second, the form of payoff functions in Proposition 1 permits us to vary the fee-
shifting parameters to capture a variety of different litigation rules as special cases.
For instance, the following litigation rules are included as important special cases:
American System ( α = β = 1): Each party pays their own legal expenses, and
the party presenting the highest quality case wins. In this case, the payoff functions
in equation (2) simplify to
ui(ei, ej, vi) =



vi − ei if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−ei if qj > qi
British System (α = 1; β = 0): The party presenting the best case wins, and
the loser pays her own legal expenses as well as those of the winning party. With this
parameterization, the payoff functions in equation (2) are:
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ui(ei, ej , vi) =



vi if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−ei − ej if qj > qi
Continental System (α = 1; β ∈ (0, 1)). The loser pays his own costs and, in
addition, pays a fraction (1− β) of the winner’s expenses:
ui (ei, ej, vi) =



vi − βei if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−ei − (1− β) ej if qj > qi
In addition to these well-known systems, our parameterization permits us to ex-
amine more exotic systems, such as ones we call the Quayle, Marshall, and Matthew
systems:
Quayle System8 (α = 2; β = 1): The loser pays his own costs and reimburses
the winner up to the level of the loser’s own costs:
ui(ei, ej , vi) =



vi − ei + ej if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−2ei if qj > qi
8As noted in introduction, we call this parameterization the “Quayle system” because Dan Quayle
chaired the President’s Council on Competitiveness, which recommended that the U.S. adopt this
mechanism in its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America (1991). Smith (1992) analyzed this
system in a model where parties’ subjective probabilities of winning may not be consistent, and in
which the determination of legal expenditures is exogenous..
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Marshall System9 (α = 0; β = 1): The Marshall system is the reverse of the
British system: the winner pays her own costs and, in addition, reimburses the loser
for all of its legal costs:
ui(ei, ej, vi) =



vi − ei − ej if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
0 if qj > qi
Matthew System10 (α = 1; β ∈ (1,∞)): The winner is required to “go the
extra mile” and transfer an amount to the loser that is proportional to the winner’s
legal expenditures. This is, in a sense, the reverse of the Quayle system which requires
the loser to transfer an amount to the winner. The payoffs for the Matthew system
are similar to the Continental rule, except β > 1:
9We call this the Marshall System in honor of George Catlett Marshall who, as U.S. Secretary of
State, organized the European Recovery Program (better known as the Marshall Plan). He is not to
be confused with Thurgood Marshall and John Marshall, both of whom served on the U.S. Supreme
Court.
10We call this the Matthew system because Matthew 5: 39-41 states:
“But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy
right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and
take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also. And whosoever shall compel thee to
go a mile, go with him twain.”
Loosely translated: If you are forced to spend $1 defending yourself in court, go the extra mile
and pay an additional amount to your adversary.
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ui(ei, ej, vi) =



vi − βei if qi > qj
vi/2− e if qi = qj
−ei − (1− β) ej if qj > qi
The auction-like structure of the these payoffs, and more generally the payoffs in
equation (2), permits us to use auction-theoretic tools to analyze this parameterized
class of legal systems. For the remainder of the analysis, we also assume:
(A4) Regularity Conditions on the Distribution of Valuations The density of
valuations is continuous and strictly positive on its support, [0, v], where 0 <
v <∞.
3 Equilibrium Outlays for Legal Services
Let ei (vi) denote the legal expenditures of a party who values the item in dispute at
vi. It is natural to assume that legal expenditures are a strictly increasing function of
the amount a litigant stands to gain by winning: e0i(vi) > 0. Under this assumption,
e−1i exists, and the expected payoff EU(ei, vi) of a party who expends ei on legal
services is:
EU(ei, vi) =
Z e−1j (ei)
0
[vi − βei − (1− α)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj
+
Z v
e−1j (ei)
[−αei − (1− β)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj . (3)
16
Differentiating with respect to ei gives the first order condition for player i’s optimal
level of legal expenditures:
1
e0j(e
−1
j (ei))
h
vi − βei − (1− α)ej(e−1j (ei))
i
f(e−1j (ei))−
Z e−1j (ei)
0
βf(vj)dvj
− 1
e0j(e
−1
j (ei))
[−αei − (1− β)ei]f(e−1j (ei))−
Z v
e−1j (ei)
αf(vj)dvj = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium, ei (v) = ej(v) = e (v) , so we may simplify the last
expression to obtain the differential equation:
e0(v) =
vf(v)
α− (α− β)F (v) +
2(α− β)f(v)
α− (α− β)F (v)e(v).
The solution to this differential equation is given by
e(v) =
Z v
0
sf(s)
α− (α− β)F (s) exp
"Z v
s
2(α− β)f(u)
α− (α− β)F (u)du
#
ds.
Straightforward manipulation (and noting Lemma 1 in the Appendix) yields
Proposition 2 Suppose the litigation environment satisfies (A1) through (A4). Then
in a symmetric equilibrium, the legal expenditures of a party who values the item in
dispute at v is
e(v) = [α− (α− β)F (v)]−2
Z v
0
sf(s)[α− (α− β)F (s)]ds. (4)
Notice that under assumptions A1 though A4, the item in dispute is always
awarded to the party presenting the best case (justice is always served), and fur-
thermore, the allocation of the item is efficient since it is always awarded to the
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party valuing it most highly (this follows from the symmetry and monotonicity of the
equilibrium expenditures in equation (4); see Lemma 1).
Table 1 shows how Proposition 2 can be used to obtain closed form expressions
for the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under various legal systems. In
each case, the resulting expenditures are obtained simply by substituting specific
parameter values for (α,β) into the general expression in Proposition 2.
Table 1: Equilibrium Legal Expenditures
for Selected Legal Systems
Legal System α, β Expenditures (e (v))
American α = 1, β = 1
R v
0 sf(s)ds
British α = 1, β = 0
R v
0
sf(s)[1−F (s)]ds
[1−F (v)]2
Continental α = 1, β ∈ (0, 1)
R v
0
sf(s)[1−(1−β)F (s)]ds
(1−(1−β)F (v))2
Marshall α = 0, β = 1
R v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
Quayle α = 2, β = 1
R v
0
sf(s)[2−F (s)]ds
[2−F (v)]2
Matthew α = 1, β ∈ (1,∞)
R v
0
sf(s)[1−(1−β)F (s)]ds
(1−(1−β)F (v))2
4 The Cost of Litigation per Trial
In order to compare the equilibrium levels of legal expenditures that arise under
different legal systems, we first establish
Proposition 3 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the equilibrium expenditures of
a litigant who values the item at v ∈ (0, v) are strictly decreasing in β.
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Proof:
Inspection of the equilibrium expenditure function in equation (4) reveals that it
is sufficient to show that
(α− (α− β)F (s))
(α− (α− β)F (v))2
is strictly decreasing in β for 0 < s < v < v. Since and (α, β) ≥ 0 with at least one
strictly positive element:
d
dβ
Ã
(α− (α− β)F (s))
(α− (α− β)F (v))2
!
=
F (s)α+ αF (s)F (v)− βF (s)F (v)− 2αF (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
≤ F (v)α+ αF (v)F (v)− βF (s)F (v)− 2αF (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
=
−αF (v) (1− F (v))− βF (s)F (v)
(α (1− F (v)) + βF (v))3
< 0
for 0 < s < v < v. QED
Thus, other things equal, litigants spend less on legal services in legal systems
where β is higher. This result stems from two effects of an increase in β. First, legal
systems with higher β’s require the winner to pay a greater share of her own legal
expenditures. This reduces the benefits of winning, and therefore induces parties to
spend less on attorneys. Second, an increase in β increases the payoff to the loser by
reducing the amount of the winner’s expenses the loser is required to pay. In fact,
when β increases above unity, the loser actually receives a direct payment from the
winner. In short, an increase in β reduces the benefit of winning relative to losing,
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and this leads to less vigorous legal battles in court.
Proposition 3 permits us to compare the expenditures arising under several of
the litigation systems in Table 1. To see this, note that the only differences in the
American, British, Continental, and Matthew systems is β, as α = 1 for all of these
systems. Since β is highest under the Matthew system and lowest under the British
system, it follows that, regardless of her valuation, a litigant will spend more under
the British system than under the Continental, American, or Matthew systems. To
summarize, the following comparisons follow as a corollary to Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the equilibrium expenditures of a
litigant who values the item at v ∈ (0, v) can be ordered as follows:
e (v)British > e (v)Continental > e (v)American > e (v)Matthew
Unfortunately, the Corollary does not provide a complete ranking of all of the
legal systems in Table 1. This stems from the fact that the equilibrium expenditure
functions under the American system and the Quayle system cross, as do expenditures
under the American system and Marshall system. In situations where the expenditure
functions cross, unambiguous expenditure rankings are not possible. To see this,
consider the special case where the distribution of values is uniformly distributed on
the unit interval (F (v) = v for v ∈ [0, 1]). In this case, equilibrium expenditures
under the American and Marshall systems are given by
eA (v) =
1
2
v2
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and
eM (v) =
1
3
v,
respectively. These functions cross at v = 2
3
: Litigants with valuations below 2
3
spend
less under the American system, while those with valuations above 2
3
spend more
under the American system.
More generally, let L (ε) = {v|v ∈ (0, ε]} and H (ε) = {v|v ∈ [v − ε, v]} denote
neighborhoods of the lowest and highest possible valuations of the item in dispute.
Proposition 4 If assumptions A1 through A4 hold and ε > 0 is sufficiently small:
(a) For v ∈ L (ε) :
e (v)Quayle < e (v)American < e (v)Marshall
(b) For v ∈ H (ε) :
e (v)Quayle > e (v)American > e (v)Marshall
Proof
Part (a). We establish the first inequality as follows. Choose ε ∈
³
0, F−1
³
2−
√
2
´´
.
Comparison of e (v)Quayle and e (v)American in Table 1 reveals that it is sufficient to
show that for all v ∈ (0, ε] and s ∈ (0, v):
2− F (s)
(2− F (v))2
< 1.
But this is easily satisfied, since
(2− F (v))2 ≥ (2− F (ε))2 >
³
2− F
³
F−1
³
2−
√
2
´´´2
= 2.
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To establish the second inequality, note that, by Lemma 2 in the Appendix, the
expenditures of a litigant who values the item at v = 0 is zero under both the
American and Marshall systems. Since e (v) is continuous in v, it is sufficient to show
that at v = 0, the slope of the expenditure function under the American system is
less than that under the Marshall system. Lemma 3 shows that this is indeed the
case, thus completing the proof of part (a). Part (b). Both inequalities for this part
of the Proposition follow from the continuity of e (v) and Lemma 4. QED
Proposition 4 reveals that the American, Quayle, and Marshall systems have quite
different implications for different types of litigants. Litigants who do not value the
disputed item very highly will tend to spend less under the Quayle system than under
the American system. In contrast, litigants who value the item highly spend more
under the Quayle system than under the American system. These results stem from
differences in payments by winners and losers under the two systems. Since the legal
expenditures of party j (and thus the quality party j’s case) are increasing in vj,
both systems imply that a party with a low valuation is unlikely to win. Under the
Quayle system, losers pay not only their own attorney fees, but also must reimburse
the winner up to the loser’s legal expenditures. Relative to the American system
(where losers only pay their own legal fees), the Quayle system thus provides litigants
with low valuations an incentive to spend less on attorneys, and litigants with high
valuations an incentive to spend more.
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Why didn’t the U.S. adopt the Quayle system? One possibility is that the median
voter valued items in dispute quite highly, and realized that her expected legal costs
would rise in moving from the American system to the Quayle system. A more
compelling reason for its failure is that, on average, the Quayle system does not lead
to an improvement over the current U.S. system. As we will see below, even though
some types prefer the Quayle system to the American System and others prefer the
American system to the Quayle system, these effects average out across all types.
More generally, if we compare the expected total expenditures that arise under each
system in Table 1, a complete ranking of expenditures is possible and furthermore,
the American, Quayle, and Marshall systems generate identical total expected legal
expenditures.
To see this, let TC denote the total expected legal expenditures that arise in a
symmetric equilibrium:
TC ≡ E[e1(v1) + e2(v2)] = 2E[e(v)].
These expenditures generally vary depending on the fee-shifting parameters of the
legal system. Legal systems that result in lower expected legal expenditures are most
desirable from the viewpoint of the litigants; from the viewpoint of attorneys, legal
systems that result in the highest expected legal expenditures are most desirable.
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Proposition 5 Under assumptions A1 through A4, total expected legal expenditures
can be ordered as follows:
TCBritish > TCContinental > TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle > TCMatthew
Proof:
Since the rankings in the Corollary 1 hold for all v, they also hold in expectation.
Thus, it is sufficient to show that TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle. Under as-
sumptions A1 through A4, e (v) is symmetric and (by Lemma 1) strictly increasing.
This means that for all (α, β) ≥ 0, the court’s allocation of the item in dispute is
efficient in the sense that the winning party values the item most highly. By the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem (see Myerson, 1981), this implies that the expected
total legal expenditures under a given legal system depends solely on the expected
payoff earned by a litigant with the lowest possible valuation.11 Using equation (3),
the payoff of a litigant who values the item at vi is
EU(vi) =
Z vi
0
[vi − βej(vi)− (1− α)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj +Z v
vi
[−αej(vi)− (1− β)ej(vj)]f(vj)dvj,
so the equilibrium payoff of the party with the lowest possible valuation is
EU(0) = −αe(0)−
Z v
0
(1− β)e(s)f(s)ds.
11We are indebted to Paul Klemperer for suggesting this proof.
24
Under the American, Marshall and Quayle systems, β = 1; thus for these legal
systems,
EU(0) = −αe(0).
Thus, it is sufficient to show that the expenditures of a litigant who values the disputed
item at v = 0 are equal under the American, Marshall, and Quayle systems. Since
Lemma 2 shows that the lowest valuation type spends zero in equilibrium under
all three systems, we conclude that TCAmerican = TCMarshall = TCQuayle. This
establishes the result. QED
5 Expected Payoffs and the Incentive to Litigate
Proposition 5 reveals that expected legal expenses are highest under the British sys-
tem and lowest under the Matthew system. In fact, by choosing β arbitrarily large
in the Matthew system, one can make total expected legal expenditures arbitrarily
small. Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that the Matthew system is the
“optimal” litigation system; after all, the judicial outcome is both efficient and just,
and furthermore, the system can be devised in a manner that “minimizes” legal ex-
penditures on a per-trial basis. This reasoning is flawed, however, as the following
analysis reveals.
By assumption A3, litigation costs are internalized, so total expected legal ex-
penditures equal the total expected utility loss from litigation. Thus, the expected
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payoffs (denoted EU) of litigants are higher in systems where expected expenditures
are lower.
Proposition 6 Under assumptions A1 through A4, the expected payoffs of litigants
can be ordered as follows:
EUBritish < EUContinental < EUAmerican = EUMarshall = EUQuayle < EUMatthew
Together, Propositions 5 and 6 illustrate an important trade-off. On the one
hand, legal systems with higher β’s result in lower equilibrium legal expenditures per
trial (Proposition 3), and the Matthew system results in the lowest possible expected
expenditures per trial. On the other hand, legal systems with higher β’s result in
higher expected payoffs from litigation, thus making it more attractive for parties
to bring suits in the first place. Thus, while the Matthew system results in lower
expenditures per trial, adopting such a system would maximize the number of cases
brought to trial. Factoring in the increased number of trials, it is not at all clear
that a movement to the Matthew system would result in lower social outlays on legal
services.
Regardless, the above results do suggest that a movement from the American to
the Continental or British systems would reduce the incentives of parties to litigate,
while a movement from the American to the Quayle system would have no impact
on litigation incentives. Testable implications of Propositions 5 and 6 include the
hypotheses that more cases are brought to trial under the American system than
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under the British or Continental systems, and that less is spent per trial under the
American system. We note that Hughes and Snyder (1995) provide empirical evidence
that the American system indeed results in fewer trials than the British system. We
are unaware of any empirical evidence regarding per-trial expenditures under different
legal systems.
To summarize, the effective costs to society of a given legal system depend not
only on the expected expenditures per trial under each system, but the number of
trials induced by each system. Ceteris paribus, systems that generate lower expected
expenditures per trial provide greater expected payoffs from litigation, and therefore
result in more cases being brought to trial.
6 Conclusion
Our auction-theoretic framework considered a symmetric litigation environment in
which the legal ownership of the disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court
observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to
the party presenting the best case (justice is always served). Litigants can influence
the quality of their case by hiring skillful attorneys. Even though the parties and the
court are asymmetrically informed, in equilibrium the court’s decision is always just
and efficient. The class of litigation systems considered includes standard systems
(such as the American, British, and Continental systems), as well as more exotic
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ones (which we call the Quayle, Marshall, and Matthew systems).
Our framework provides a complete ranking of a continuum of different legal
systems. Equilibrium legal expenditures per trial are decreasing in proportion of the
winner’s attorney fees that must be paid to the loser, while the expected payoffs of
the litigants are an increasing function of this proportion. This results in a trade-
off: litigation systems with lower equilibrium legal expenditures per trial (such as
the American, Quayle, and Matthew systems) provide a greater incentive for parties
to sue than systems that entail higher equilibrium legal expenditures (such as the
British and Continental systems).
Our analysis also reveals that a movement from the American system to the
Quayle system would neither reduce expected legal expenditures on a per-trial basis
nor reduce the incentives for parties to litigate. To the extent that America’s reputa-
tion for being a litigious society is based on the shear number of suits brought to trial
in the U.S., a movement toward the Continental or British system might improve
matters by reducing the number of suits and the strain on the court system. Unfor-
tunately, such a move would result in higher expected legal costs on a per-trial basis.
While our analysis ignores the impact of budget constraints, one undesirable feature
of such a move might be to make courts a playing field for only the wealthy. The
simple auction-theoretic litigation framework set forth in this paper, coupled with
recent work by Che and Gayle (1998) on auctions with budget-constrained players,
may serve as a useful starting point for a more complete analysis of these types of
28
issues.
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A Appendix
The heuristic argument used to derive the expression in equation (4) assumes that
ej (vi) > 0 and e
0
j(vi) > 0 for vi ∈ (0, v) . The following Lemma shows that these
conditions are satisfied by the expression in equation (4).
Lemma 1 e (v) in equation (4) satisfies the following properties for all v ∈ (0, v):
(a) e (v) > 0;
(b) e0(v) > 0.
Proof.
(a) This part follows from the fact that α(1 − F (s)) + βF (s) > 0 for v ∈ (0, v),
and (α, β) ≥ 0 with at least one element strictly positive. (b) To see that e0(v) > 0,
differentiate (4) to obtain
de(v)
dv
=
f(v)
([α− (α− β)F (v)])3
Q(v),
where
Q(v) = 2(α− β)
Z v
0
sf(s)[α(1− F (s)) + βF (s)]ds
+v[α(1− F (v)) + βF (v)]2.
Evidently, for α ≥ β, Q(v) > 0 and hence e0(v) > 0. When α = 0, Q(v) can be
simplified to
Q(v) = −2β
Z v
0
sf(s)βF (s)ds+ vβ2F (v)2
= β2
Z v
0
F (s)2ds > 0.
30
Thus if α = 0 and β > 0 then e0(v) > 0. For the case 0 < α < β, we note that the
factors with 2αβ can be rewritten as
Z v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds−
Z v
0
sf(s)(1− F (s))ds+ v(1− F (v))F (v)
=
Z v
0
F (s)(1− F (s))ds > 0.
Let eA (v), eM (v), and eQ (v) denote the equilibrium expenditures arising under
the American, Marshall, and Quayle systems.
Lemma 2 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→0
eA (v) = lim
v→0
eQ (v) = lim
v→0
eM (v) = 0.
Proof. The first two equalities follow directly, since
lim
v→0
eA (v) = lim
v→0
Z v
0
sf(s)ds = 0
and
lim
v→0
eQ (v) = lim
v→0
R v
0 sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
(2− F (v))2 = 0.
For the last equality, use L’Hospital’s rule to obtain
lim
v→0
eM (v) = lim
v→0
R v
0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
= lim
v→0
vf(v)F (v)
2F (v)f (v)
= 0.
Lemma 3 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→0
deM (v)
dv
> lim
v→0
deA (v)
dv
= 0
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Proof. Note that
deM (v)
dv
= f (v)
"
F (v)2 v − 2
R v
0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)3
#
and
deA (v)
dv
= vf(v).
Clearly,
lim
v→0
deA (v)
dv
= 0.
Using L’Hospital’s Rule,
lim
v→0
deM (v)
dv
= lim
v→0
f (v) lim
v→0
"
2vf (v)F (v) v + F (v)2 − 2vf(v)F (v)
3F (v)2 f (v)
#
= f (0) lim
v→0
"
1
3f (v)
#
=
1
3
> 0,
and the result follows.
Lemma 4 Under assumptions A1 through A4,
lim
v→v
eQ (v) > lim
v→v
eA (v) > lim
v→v
eM (v) > 0
Proof. The last inequality follows from the fact that
eM (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eM (v)
= lim
v→v
R v
0 sf(s)F (s)ds
F (v)2
=
Z v
0
sf(s)F (s)ds > 0.
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To establish the middle inequality, note that
eA (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eA (v)
= lim
v→v
Z v
0
sf(s)ds
=
Z v
0
sf(s)ds
> eM (v) .
Finally, we establish the first inequality:
eQ (v) ≡ lim
v→v
eQ (v)
= lim
v→v
R v
0 sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
(2− F (v))2
=
Z v
0
sf(s)[2− F (s)]ds
= 2eA (v)− eM (v)
> 2eA (v)− eA (v)
= eA (v) .
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